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The Sargent

Leader and Legacy

Governorship
Richard A. Hogarty

Following in the long line of succession of his predecessors, Francis W. Sargent
served as the sixty-third governor of Massachusetts. A lifelong Republican, he
was a man of character and sterling Yankee blue-blood lineage with the stature

of a political independent. Grappling with a series of hot political issues and
braving the passions and divisions spawned by the war in Vietnam, he was one
of the ablest and most intriguing men ever to be governor. He worked hard at

knowing his constituents and their concerns, but he did not always provide
them with easy answers. Several new ideas were transformed into policy during
his tenure as governor. Some of these adjustments required trial and error as
well as the courage to face and learn from mistakes. This article reviews
Sargent's political career in depth and evaluates his performance as chief
executive.

History reminds us that nothing counterfeit has any staying power, an observation, incidentally, made by Cicero about 60 B.C. History teaches that character counts. Character above all.

—

At

the height of his

influential

power and

Republican

in

David McCullough, 1998

was the most visible and
dynamic and visionary party leader,

popularity, Frank Sargent

Massachusetts.

A

he served as governor during the turbulent and event-filled years from 1969
1975.

A

relatively liberal Republican in an

overwhelmingly Democratic

Sargent recognized the political world in which he lived, accepted

and moved through
days.

He reached

it

it

for

to

state,

what

it

was,

with a dash and verve rarely seen in American politics these

out for contact and, indeed, for confrontation. Adept

people and sorting out power relationships, he was astute

at

at

reading

gauging public opinion

and calculating electoral interests. Relying on his traditional base of Republican
support, he crossed party lines and appealed to liberal Democrats and Independents,
thereby expanding his statewide base. Sargent held the governorship twice, from
1969 to 1970, when he completed the remaining two years of the unexpired term of
his predecessor, John Volpe, and again from 1971 to 1975, when he was elected to a
full

four-year term.

Richard Hogarty is professor emeritus and a senior fellow at the John W. McCormack
Institute of Public Affairs, University of Massachusetts Boston.
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known by

nickname "Sarge," the Yankee reformer first ran for
on the same ticket with Governor John Volpe, a Republican powerhouse who carried him into office. Plucked from virtual obscurity,
Sargent adopted the catchy campaign slogan "Put Sarge in charge," which caught on
Affectionately

his

lieutenant governor in 1966

Becoming lucky, he was thrust into the
when President Richard Nixon tapped Volpe to become his secre-

with the public and became his rallying cry.
governor's office

Washington.

tary of transportation in

undertake an analysis of Frank Sargent's style and strategy as a public person.

I

What does

Sargent's career

tell

us about the role of character and personality in

executive politics and decision making?

I

also

examine

he made on the office of governor. The

impact

his leadership style

last sections

and the

suggest reflectively the

curiously mixed legacy Sargent left behind.

Evaluating the performance of a single governor

is

no simple undertaking. To

begin with, the sources of power available to a governor are elusive and variable,

and the interpretation of the data used

Whether a governor

become

performance

significantly involved, is the result of a subtle

A

a single determinant.

pends

to evaluate

will prevail in a dispute over policy, or

in large

governor

is first

is in

part subjective.

even whether he will

combination of

factors, not of

and foremost a politician whose career de-

measure on the successful negotiation of bargains.

When

confronted

with conflicting demands, he helps to maintain a viable society by the process of
brokering mutual concessions. Political bargaining and compromise

The

of the political process.

will to

lie at the

heart

conquer and to make a difference also comes

into play.
In terms of the historical

development of the

office,

Frank Sargent undoubtedly

benefited from the contributions of the sixty-two governors, an incredibly assorted

who had preceded

lot,

him.

Some were

business moguls and party bosses;

rogues and thieves; some the mere agents of

some were amiable

nonentities, adept at platitude

and evasion, who served their terms and faded into deserved oblivion.

were men of

ability

group of chiefs of

and personal distinction

who would compare

Still

others

favorably with any

drawn from a comparable society that developed in three
few hundred hardy settlers to a metropolitan state of

state

centuries from a collection of a

6 million people.

Both

in style

1

and

strategy, Sargent represented a sharp

break from his predeces-

Looking on the governorship as a unique position of responsibility, he saw
himself as the chief problem solver. Politics for him was a game of risk. Like most
sors.

elected officials, he kept his advocacy general, positioning himself to take credit for

Even this approach involved
went wrong, but he realized it
were hardly cautious. Where he differed most from his

successes and to join the critics in the event of failure.

a

modicum of

need not be

risk that

fatal.

fellow governors

he would be blamed

His politics

was

in

choosing

if

things

to lead rather than

simply follow the dictates of

the legislature. Dating back to colonial and revolutionary times, there had always

been a strong tradition of legislative supremacy

in

Massachusetts. The Governor's

Council, which had to approve almost everything a governor did,

was purposely

created as a political check on he executive.

For more than a century after the adoption of

was

for all practical

its

1780 Constitution,

the legislature

purposes the state government. The governor's formal role in

policymaking was very small, and his informal authority depended on his personality

and his party strength. Although elected

at large, the
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governor served

in office

for a term of

two

years, subject to reelection. This short term limit seriously re-

programs enacted.

stricted his ability to get his

considerable power during the

first

A

handful of governors attained

half of the twentieth century, but the legislature

remained dominant. 2 In marked contrast, Sargent was a prime example of a gov-

still

ernor

When

who both

and

in crisis

in

ordinary times broadened gubernatorial authority.

he cared intensely about a given issue, he reached out for the views of others

and responded

would garner support from a coalition of

to ideas that

interests. In so

doing, he exerted the kind of policy leadership that had rarely been found in any of
the previous administrations.

An

Altered Political and Cultural Landscape

As

a point of departure,

to

power

in

came
Numerous

important to acknowledge that Governor Sargent

it is

a tumultuous era, a time of great social upheaval in America.

combustible elements were present, including high unemployment, rampant infla-

and recession. Assassinations, growing protests against the esca-

tion, oil shortages,

lating

war

Vietnam,

in

civil rights

demonstrations, urban

riots,

prison uprisings,

racial violence over school busing, tenants rights, welfare rights,

and countless other

public discontents surfaced. Cities were beset with seemingly intractable problems.

Slums, poverty,

menaced
There was

that

Many

drug abuse, and gang wars were

street crime,

the quality of urban

a general sense of alienation

blacks and Latinos

felt

among

the social

ills

life.

among

marginalized or

minorities across the country.

out of the political system. Politics

left

The 1965 Voting
movement had produced some gains for black
Americans, but the underlying racism continued. The spillover effects of the Vietnam War, which drained the nation's resources to fight the war against poverty at
home, poisoned the domestic policy. Student protests and campus riots disrupted
them was not

for

the

same

as politics for other ethnic groups.

Rights Act and the black power

university

life.

Dissenting groups marched in the streets, took over public buildings,

and shut down colleges

in order to protest

what they believed

to

be an unjust war

in

Southeast Asia and inequalities at home. These societal and economic forces com-

bined to make the forging of gubernatorial policy a hard job.

A

state constitutional

amendment, adopted

in

1964, had lengthened gubernatorial

terms from two to four years, so Frank Sargent had twenty-two months
date his position before facing the electorate.

1969,

at the

age of

had been a Volpe

The

fifty-four,

loyalist or acolyte

was

When

he was viewed as a

to consoli-

he became governor

in

January

political lightweight. After all,

and was not considered a force

in his

own

he

right.

smooth because he picked up where Volpe had left off, but
in mind and without a clear public agenda. But as
time went on, Sargent emerged as an independent chief executive who proved to be
quite different from Volpe.
The tempo of gubernatorial initiative varies with the disposition of the incumtransition

fairly

he assumed office with few ideas

bent, be he passive or active, positive or negative. Sargent

and

positive,

was

inclined to be active

and the pace of the policy process increased accordingly. His intention

from the outset was

to

make himself

a highly visible governor, a symbol of energy

and motion, accepting responsibility for a broad range of public issues, seeking
be innovative on the one hand and reactive on the
likely to

ensue when he had

to deal

with a

other. Innovations

crisis, for
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then he

to

were more

was more

reactive than

New England Journal

He

engaged.

of Public Policy

gravitated to the politics of innovation, although the circumstances were

often less than auspicious.

For as long as he was

in office,

Sargent

made

the

most of

his political opportunity,

but he had to deal with a legislature controlled by Democrats. This
ity to set aside

partisanship and to

came

By

into play.

work with

is

where

his abil-

partisans of a different persuasion

the time he finished his second term in 1975, he had achieved

significant reforms in urban transportation, public housing, civil rights, environmental

protection, mental health, gun control, special education, public welfare, juvenile

and adult correctional systems, social services for children and the

sumer protection.
The Republicans had been

the

dominant party

end of the Civil War, but they were now declining

in
in

elderly,

and con-

Massachusetts ever since the
numerical strength. While they

controlled the governorship from 1964 to 1974, the Democrats had controlled the
legislature since 1958.

The Republicans,

for the less visible statewide offices,

By

no longer able to mount serious contests
were plunging ever deeper into minority party

Republicans, and the

outnumbered in the legislature by almost a
Democrats greatly outnumbered registered
number of Independents was on the rise. The Bay State was

considered Kennedy

territory.

status.

three to

the early 1970s, they were

one margin. In

fact, registered

Not surprisingly, the Massachusetts voters rejected President Richard Nixon
when he ran for reelection in 1972, voting for U.S. Senator George McGovern of
South Dakota, who accused Nixon of prolonging the unpopular war in Vietnam. A
bastion of liberalism, Massachusetts could claim the distinction of being the only
state to

go

broke

dal

McGovern, a lesson not lost on its citizens. When the Watergate scanbumper stickers sent a subtle but sobering message to the rest of
I'm From Massachusetts.
Don't Blame Me
for

in 1974,

the nation:

—

Against the onslaughts of

new

realities of

changing

this volatile

life in

environment, Sargent grappled with the

America and

dealt in practical fashion with the

pressing public issues of the day. Considering the hundreds of
into law, three deserve special mention.

One was

which mandated low-income public housing
tion in the nation.

The

he signed

bills that

the so-called anti-snob zoning law,

in the suburbs,

the first such legisla-

no-fault insurance bill eliminated unnecessary litigation and

thereby reduced the high costs of automobile insurance,

lenged the legality of the Vietnam War. The

last

while the Shea

two pieces of

bill

legislation

chal-

were spon-

sored by liberal Democrats Michael Dukakis and James Shea, respectively. The Shea

which put the state in prominent opposition to the war, was later declared unby the courts. Sadly, Shea ended his life in suicide. Considered a rising star from his earliest days, Dukakis was an ambitious Brookline lawyer who had
already set his sights on the governorship.

bill,

constitutional

Sargent

— A New Kind of Republican

Sargent was an amalgam of North Shore patrician and hardy Cape

Having lived intermittently

in

both parts of the

gland Yankee. His architectural education at
tional

Harvard

Law

state,

MIT

Cod

he was a purebred

fisherman.

New

En-

signaled a break from the tradi-

School career path. All of which meant that he not only had a

technological capacity, but also used his technical knowledge for problem solving

and identifying policy alternatives.
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Sargent was neither your typical, dyed-in-the-wool, conservative Republican nor
an ideologue, which gave him wide latitude

in

decision making.' Reared

in the

pro-

some ways a throwback to President
gressive Yankee reform
Roosevelt,
Sargent,
whose passion was the environment,
Theodore Roosevelt. Like
was an ardent conservationist who sought to save the Massachusetts shoreline. He
championed issues like clean air, clean water, and open space. He was an environmentalist before the term came into popular usage, and the celebration of Earth Day
arrived before the term had entered the public consciousness. When most of Cape
Cod was still relatively unspoiled, Sargent sounded the alarm about the impending
was

tradition, he

danger

to its pristine

in

sand dunes and beaches, which were gradually being destroyed

by the construction of new housing and large-scale commercial developments. To
prevent such a calamity from happening, he spearheaded a crusade to establish what

became

the

Cape Cod National Seashore. But more about

Sargent had a political hero,

If

had successfully cast aside

it

was

New

that later.

York City's mayor, John Lindsay, who

base of Republican support and built po-

his traditional

depended heavily on liberal support. As political actors,
Sargent and Lindsay were paired comfortably in ideology and outlook. Both were

litical

alliances that

liberal

Republicans

who understood and

exploited their position as popularly

elected chief executives. Both exercised their executive powers forcefully and inde-

pendently, acting as they thought conditions
office permitted. Eventually,

demanded and

Lindsay changed his party

their

conception of the

affiliation

and became a

Democrat; Sargent remained on the reservation but distanced himself from Richard

Nixon
lect,

who
wars

operated, he

at the State

was

House. Secure in his convictions about how the world

willing to take risks and to push the boundaries of policy leader-

Nothing written about him disputes

ship.

The Interplay

and

politics

the pragmatist, he typically

humor, which did a

lot to

political adversaries,

when

life

this interpretation.

of Personality and Politics

interplay of personality

much

dealt

its

had a

managed

lot to

soothe chaffed egos. While he delighted in taunting his

he also offered them words of kindness and encouragement

who watched him

blows. Democrats,

former Senate president Kevin Harrington
tough guy.

do with Sargent's success. Very
comments with good

to intersperse his

and charm he used with a flourish did not come
tally

to right-wing conser-

increasingly dominated his party. Simply put, he possessed the intel-

mental toughness, and combativeness that were necessary to survive the nasty

political

The

endeared him

as far as possible, a position that less than

vatives,

When

he believed

in

at the

recalls,

perform, concede that the wit

expense of his principles. As

"He was

men-

a physically and

something, nobody could argue him in or out

of anything." 4 While Sarge frequently "went along to get along," he was no Puritan

and had no difficulty compromising

mined

to lean

hard

in directions that

in order to cut deals. Nonetheless,

he believed

to

be

Sargent had a knack for sizing up a situation and turning

When

adequately provoked or frustrated, he could get

he was deter-

right.

mad

it

to his

advantage.

and swear

like a trooper,

but a self-deprecating wit reassured people that he did not take himself too
ously.

He enjoyed

was aware of

its

the public limelight and the excitement of political

dark

side.

On

one occasion he admitted,
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life,

"When anyone

seri-

but he

asks

me

if

New England Journal of Public

Policy

they should go into politics.

manding,

More

I

always say, 'Can your marriage stand

and doesn't ever

frustrating,

it?'

Politics is de-

stop."-

than one political rival referred to Sargent as the Marlboro man. Others

referred to

him

words of John Powers, "He was the Yankee

as a tree hugger. In the

Republican poster boy (Norman Rockwell actually painted his
angular with sandy

and the

hair, a lantern jaw.

out in horse country, growing his

own

portrait), spare

and

whistling through his teeth, living

'S'

more

vegetables, and spending not a nickel

than necessary." 6

Given

how

and resonant voice, Sargent learned

his looks

on television.

his advantage, especially

mobilize public opinion

in

He became

use these assets to

to

adroit at using this

support of his programs, even

times

if at

over the head of the legislature to say what needed to be done.

He

medium

to

meant going

it

fully exploited

messages to the legislature were
consciously addressed to a wider public. In a 1974 interview Sargent commented,
"As a governor, you're not a dictator. You have to be able to persuade the people.
the public relations potential of the office. His

One of

the problems

inspiration, he

is

had the

getting too far out in front of public opinion."
ability to

Whatever the

educate and the capacity to appear concerned with

the problems of everyone while remaining
political whirlwind. In

7

calm and collected

in the

midst of a

an era when the word politician was becoming increasingly

associated with greed, corruption, and venality, he had a reputation for honesty,
integrity,

and independence.

In 1938. Sargent

had married well

—

Jessie Fay, a

Yankee of impeccable

lineage.

Like her husband, she enjoyed the outdoors and did more than her share of volunteer

work in
was a

the

Jessie

community. Sargent was a Unitarian, his wife an Episcopalian.

liberal

Republican

social issues dealing with

who campaigned

for her

day care centers, elderly

husband and supported

affairs,

mental retardation, low-

income housing, and juvenile detention centers. She played a leading role in the
Women's Political Caucus and co-chaired a state Commission on Citizen Participation. In her aptly titled book The Governor's Wife, Jessie defined her role.
As

a Governor's wife,

I

am

never in a position to raise a

are often

low-keyed and behind the scenes.

behaving

in a

manner not embarrassing

to

I

my

have

is

known

before the election the

shrill voice.

My

efforts

be aware of "bad press" and

husband or the administration ...

strongly believe that a wife can be a tremendous

she

to

campaign

more help she can

asset

and the

be. If she's

been

I

better
to a

neighborhood before, made friends there, helped with local projects and shown
concern for their local problems, the candidate's wife can be a major help for
gaining endorsement of her husband's policies and candidacy. 8

Glimpses of the Private

Man

life, Sargent was surrounded by close
whose wealth was extraordinary could afford.

In his private

friends and a lifestyle that only

those

Politically

he

may have cham-

pioned the needs of the poor and disadvantaged, but socially he gravitated toward
the rich and powerful. Both he and his wife

more

were very private people, Jessie the
They had a private life as well as a public life. They were
inaccessible. That was part of their mystique.
parlance, Sargent had what is known as the common touch. Douglas

private of the two. 9

accessible yet
In political
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Foy, director of the Conservation

up

to a toll

name

tag,

and

man, but

the

vote, the

Law

Foundation,

the story about Sarge's driving

tells

booth on the Massachusetts Turnpike, quickly reading the

that

toll collector's

up a friendly conversation with him. He, of course, had never met

striking

was beside

While the

the point.

collector represented a potential

toll

governor interacted with him both as a public and a private man.

Another story

is

told about Sargent's befriending a

young eleven-year-old boy while

game at Fenway Park in October 1967, the year of the
Boston Red Sox playing the Saint Louis Cardinals. The

attending a World Series baseball

"Impossible Dream," with the
boy's father,

who had purchased two

separate tickets from a scalper,

was unable

to sit

with his son, so he planted him in a box seat next to the lieutenant governor. Thirty-one
years

later,

the youngster, by then a

Sargent treated

we had gone

me

as if

to the

peanuts, whatever.

I

game

grown man, recounted what happened:

was the most important guy
together.

He asked me

was keeping the box

I

would lean over and

say,

score,

"What'd he do his

last

if

I

was

in the ballpark. It

as if

wanted a hot dog. popcorn,

and as the game went on Sarge
time up?" or

Lonborg struck out?" The box was swarming with

visitors,

"How many

of course,

all

has

looking to

shake Sarge's hand or talk a little politics. I still remember that late in the game,
Yaz got up and singled cleanly to right. Sarge stood up, applauded, and said, to no
one in particular, "That's a damn good hit." 11

Sargent described himself as being from the "fin,
ing

companion

used

and feather

recalled an incident that took place in the

hunt together.

to

fur,

I

folks."

12

A

hunt-

predawn darkness. "We

remember when he'd show up in the early morning, fire off
my bedroom window, and yell, "Get up, you lazy bum."
13

his shotgun right beneath

was not his strong suit.
As a fisherman, Sargent became acquainted with all kinds of people in a world
removed from Beacon Hill. He told this shaggy dog tale about the owner of
Thompson's Clam Bar and Wychmere Harbor Club on the Cape.
Subtlety

I

got to

know almost everybody on

place where you could

One day he was
where the
told him.

hell

stiff

sell

your

the waterfront. There

fish,

and he spotted

and he used

me

as he

was a guy who ran a

to drink like a son-of-a-bitch.

was going by our house. "Sarge.

have you been?" he called out. "I've been in bed with sciatica,"

"Who's she?" he

said. Well, Jessie

far

was

there

I

and she died laughing. 14

These episodes provide us with glimpses of the lesser-known Sargent who was
seldom seen

in public.

loved to do.

He was more

His son Bill says that his father "loved doing things that kids

personal element because

like a grandfather to us."
it

was such a

vitally

15

It is

essential to understand the

important aspect of his power.

Sargent's Inner Circle and Decision-making Style

While Sargent had a
had

little

issues until they
political action

single

fairly clear

sense of where he

fit

in the political spectrum,

he

patience with philosophic discussion and very limited curiosity about

were actually thrust upon him. He craved being

at the center

of

and enjoyed dealing with urgent and momentous choices. Sargent's

most important

quality

was

his ability to

make bold

decisions.

He

liked to

make

decisions in a quasi-judicial mode, preferring to let things bubble up and choosing from
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among alternatives developed and debated by his staff. 16
As governor, Sargent operated on the principle of centralized management. He
assembled a small staff and appointed the best people he could find
various executive departments and agencies.

to

head the

They were a mix of old and new

faces

by Sargent. The inner circle consisted of four men with whom he had
worked closely prior to becoming governor: Donald Dwight, a mainstream moderate
Republican; Albert Kramer, a liberal Democrat and former state representative who
came from an urban working-class district in Chelsea; Robert Yasi, a former civil
largely picked

who understood the workings of the state bureaucracy; and Jack Flannery, a
who worried about Sargent's political stakes and how he fared with
media. As the pressures of office descended upon them, these advisers struggled

servant

former newsman
the

for the governor's

mind, and they served him well. Dwight and Kramer remained the

main policy advocates; Flannery served as a counterweight to Kramer. Steve
Teichner and Tom Reardon, another newspaperman, joined this group somewhat
later. Both Reardon and Flannery advanced the administration's position with ediand writers.
Alan Altshuler, an MIT academic who headed the governor's task force on highways and later became his secretary of transportation and construction, points out,
"Sargent's personal inner circle had a high degree of continuity through his six

tors

years in office, and

it

remained dominant, even

after the cabinet

came

into being,

matters that seemed to involve high personal stakes for the governor." 17

nor sought

to

on

The gover-

avoid becoming captured by the special interests and clientele groups

that abound in public life. He trusted his staff to sort out the arguments put forward
by outsiders and to craft his best alternatives. Sometimes his staff second-guessed
his agency and department heads, which became a source of friction and internal

squabbles.

Martha Weinberg's Managing

the State, published in 1977, provides a detailed

account of Sargent's relationship as governor with four specific state agencies. According to Weinberg, Sargent tried to exercise some degree of executive control
over the Department of Public Works and the Department of Public Welfare, but he

Agency and the
Department of Mental Health. These agencies are good examples of his willingness
to intervene when he perceived there was a public or political crisis and to remain
relatively unengaged in issues where these imperatives did not exist. Weinberg ardid not attempt to do so with the Massachusetts Housing Finance

gues that Sargent remained both

crisis-oriented and reactive throughout his tenure,

responding to the flow of pressing issues and limiting himself to selecting from

among

options developed by others. 18

Sargent embraced an active, involved role for government and accepted the real-

of the welfare state. These were trends thoroughly consistent with the governor's
temperament and philosophy. Most Republican politicians, by instinct and disposition, went the other way. Portrayed in the media as "a maverick governor of a maver-

ity

was a leader whose popular appeal transcended party lines. 19 The
crossover politician, he was shrewd enough to reach out
to Democrats and Independents alike. Charles Kenney and Robert Turner, two veteran State House reporters who watched the Sargent battles at close range, described
him in these terms, "Though a Republican, he was moderate to liberal on most is-

ick state," Sargent

archetype of a

sues,

new breed of

and he relished the give-and-take that were an essential part of relations with

the Democratic legislature.

Most important,

the voters loved him."

120
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In 1970,

He

won

Sargent the incumbent easily

his party's

nomination for governor.

picked Donald Dwighl as his running mate. In the general election, he ran against

Democrat Kevin White, the mayor of Boston. Campaigning throughout the state.
Sargent not only energized his Republican base, but he appealed to women, blacks,
Hispanics, and the elderly. At one point, he lost his voice to laryngitis, so his wife
and three grown children had to fill in for him as surrogates. When the ballots were
finally counted, Sargent had defeated White by 259,354 votes, representing 56.7
percent of the total, to win his first full term as governor. Much to the chagrin of his
opponent, Sargent even carried the city of Boston. After a grueling campaign, having

won

the corner office in his

The morning

own

he was no longer an accidental governor.

right,

after the election, Sargent

and White had breakfast together

at the

As Sargent recalled, "When we were done, Kevin
and said, "I know goddamn well you're not going to pay for

Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Boston.

grabbed for the
this."

21

bill,"

Sargent enjoyed jousting with Irish Democrats, and as a Yankee Republican

he made an easy target for them. The governor was adept

He was

playing ethnic politics.

at

especially fond of attending the annual Saint Patrick's

Dorgan's restaurant in South Boston hosted by

up comedian

in his

own

right.

state senator

Day brunch

at

William Bulger, a stand-

Both men enjoyed roasting each other in a good-nawas a ritual of Irish-American

tured way. This breakfast of corned beef and cabbage
political culture.

While campaigning

in certain

End, Sargent never failed to mention his

membership

in the Braintree

Lodge of

neighborhoods, like Boston's North

Italian

grandmother.

the Sons of Italy,

He

also boasted of his

which further cemented

his

relations with the Italian population of the state.

Sargent governed more by the sheer force of his personality than by any grant of

many ways,

his personality matched his politics. He enjoyed marchpumping hands, and hanging out with Irish politicians
who loved to needle him. Kevin White once commented that Sargent was the best he had
ever seen in a parade, that he could make eye contact with every man, woman, and child
along the parade route. 22 He was a relatively simple man, not complex or Machiavellian.
David Nyhan, one of the most perceptive commentators on the Massachusetts political
scene, drew this portrait of him:

formal authority. In

ing in parades, slapping backs,

What

the political

community prized most in Frank Sargent was the laughter. No
had more fun in office, as often at his own expense as at

politician of his rank

another's.

He was

not a complicated man, of twisted psyche, inner turmoil, or

desperate ambition. Frank
leader,

a splendid fellow?

Having

was Frank:

an honest public servant.

And

a beautiful man, a solid friend, an able

a million laughs. What's not to prize in such

23

risen through the ranks of the fish-and-game

and the public works bu-

government to the
proved to be more
of a political asset than a liability. He knew a lot about how government worked and
who all the key players were. This knowledge and experience, coupled with his
determination to lead rather than follow, made him a different kind of governor.
Looking back at the social and economic conditions that existed in the Bay State
driving the late 1960s and early 1970s, the political situation was clearly manipulable
from the vantage point of someone like Sargent. He believed that there was no point in

reaucracies, Sargent brought twenty-two years of experience in
task.

The only

thing he lacked

was

legislative experience, but this
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it

could be used effectively. Furthermore, he recognized the social

ferment and discontent that were brewing
that

caused people

thought

to press for social

in

Massachusetts and understood the reasons

change.

He used

whenever he
ample evidence to sug-

the bully pulpit

necessary, but he seldom preached to people. There

it

is

gest that constituency and leader were attuned to each other's calculations.

Toward the end of his second term, however, Sargent would come to recognize that
the magic had gone out of the enterprise. A booming economy had enabled him to create
and expand programs without major tax increases until his final year. In October 1973,
the economy began to falter with the disruption of oil supplies, which was compounded
by rising unemployment and double-digit inflation, or what became known as
"stagflation." Sargent's star was sinking fast and with it any grand notions of a third term.
In his bid for reelection in 1974,

Dukakis,

who

he faced a formidable Democratic opponent

in

Michael

appealed to the same constituencies that Sargent had cultivated.

But as the campaign wore on, Sargent seemed

to

stumble and became preoccupied

away
was made

with falling public opinion polls and day-to-day crises. Not only had he drifted

from his conservative Republican base, he had also antagonized

it.

A big

flap

about his borrowing $40,000 from his wife to finance his campaign, violating the provisions of a recently passed campaign-finance law. In typical fashion, Sargent dismissed
this disclosure

He

with wry humor.

told the Everett Rotary

come up with

not arrive in time for lunch. "I couldn't
solemnly. "Jessie wouldn't lend

me

the dough."

Club

that

the price of the ticket," he said

24

turned out to be a hard-fought and bitterly contested campaign.

It

Day, Dukakis garnered 992,284 votes, 53.5 percent of the

shrugged off his defeat by blaming

blow

didn't

my

stack at

all. I

it

Election

beyond his
was time for a change. Sargent

it

on "the price of hamburg." As he put

could kind of see

the substantial cause of his defeat

among

On

compared with
control. The Republi-

total, as

Sargent's 784,353. Sargent was defeated by factors

cans had held the governorship since 1964 and

was

he was sorry he did

it

it,

"I

coming." 25 Whether the economy

no one can say for

certain, but

it

was

surely

the major causes. Racial violence over court-ordered school busing had

erupted in Boston in September 1974, just two months prior to the election. Sargent

supported the

ment

officer,

state's Racial

he sent

Imbalance Act of 1965, and as the chief law enforce-

in National

Guard troops

to quell the civil disturbance.

26

The

presence of state troops inflamed passions, especially in South Boston, which be-

came

a hotbed of antibusing. Through the ever present lens of network television,

watched the ugly upheaval unleashed by the desegregation orders of
To top it off, Watergate, the Nixon pardon, oil shock,
and the faltering economy all made 1974 a disastrous year for the Republican Party

the nation

federal judge Arthur Garrity.

nationally. Sargent ran about as far

had

in

was a crushing

The

ahead of the

winning a comfortable victory four years

Political

rest

of the Republican ticket as he

earlier,

but the outcome this time

defeat.

Apprenticeship

Frank Sargent was born on July 29, 1915, in the small rural town of Hamilton, Massachusetts, where the social elite on the North Shore played polo and other equestrian sports. A
patrician

by

birth

and disposition, he could lay claim

722

to a sterling

Yankee background.

Reared a child of privilege, he was a half cousin

to the

famous American painter John

Singer Sargent. These family credentials gave him impeccable native-born, blue-blood

Not much

status.

is

known about

Frank was only three years

New

old.

his early childhood except that his father died

England amateur boxing and sculling champion,

outdoors.

Lee

ing an Italian

who was

His maternal grandfather, George Lee,
instilled in

when

a former

him the love of the

also contributed to the future political fortunes of his grandson by marry-

woman, Eva

Ballarini.

Sargent and his brother grew up in a family without a father or one they would
never

come

to

know. The family had an

This set of circumstances

needed

to

make

may

nurse

Irish

who helped to raise the two boys.
why the future governor

explain psychologically

friends and later

why he

got along so well with Irish politicians. His

mother eventually married Arthur Adams. The Adams family, direct descendants of
President John Quincy

Adams, were

quite conservative while the Sargents

were very

There were tensions between the two families. Young Frank Sargent was sent

liberal.

to the exclusive

Noble and Greenough School

in

Dedham, where he developed

his

social graces and prepared for college. There he wanted everybody to be his friend,

including the teachers and janitors. 27 In 1935, he passed up Harvard, a Brahmin
preserve, to study architecture at MIT.

After graduating from

MIT

in 1939,

Sargent joined the prestigious Boston archi-

tectural firm of Coolidge, Shepley, Bulfinch

and Abbott, apprenticing as a draftsman.

For a brief period, he worked as a carpenter

to learn the building trades firsthand.

and a

MIT

bombed

He

classmate opened a small architect's office. Shortly after the Japanese

Pearl Harbor, Sargent enlisted in the U.S.

Army. An accomplished

skier,

he

volunteered as a ski trooper and was assigned to the famed 10th Mountain Division,

which trained hard
to captain,

in

he fought

Heart and Bronze

Colorado for

alpine combat. Rising in the ranks

from private

where he was wounded twice and earned the Purple
His combat record would later serve him in good stead with

in Italy,

Star.

veterans groups.

On

returning from the war, Sargent devoted himself to his career and to raising a

The war had changed his outlook on life. Abandoning architecture, he settled
Cod to earn a living doing what he loved most, namely, hunting
and fishing. In the fall he worked as a duck guide, in the winter he fished commercially for lobster and halibut, and in the spring and summer he ran a charter boat out
of Rock Harbor. He also operated a successful sporting goods business and opened
the Goose Hummock Shop on Route 6A. One of the shop's early best-sellers was a
family.

in

Orleans on Cape

goose decoy that Sargent had fashioned from cork insulation board and a fishnet
float.

Before long, Sargent grew bored with running his business. His advocacy of

ermen would take him
illegal netting

into politics. In

of striped bass.

He

Rock Harbor he had heard

fish-

stories about the

investigated the matter and started a crusade to

stop this abuse. Sargent invited Republican governor Robert Bradford to board his

boat and see for himself.

He showed

properly. Bradford then asked

him

to

Bradford that the current laws were not working

become

the state's director of marine fisheries

in 1947. Sargent agreed to take the job for the winter but

remained

in the post for

almost ten years.

Commercial fishermen were upset by the appointment of a man whom they conthem by shipping out with
the Boston trawler fleet and working as one of the crew on the Grand Banks. He also
sidered an amateur and dilettante, but Sargent surprised
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devoted considerable time speaking to rod-and-gun clubs, garden clubs, Audubon

own

groups, and other conservationists about the dangers of pollution. In Sargent's

words, "I used to be kind of a voice in the wilderness, railing against pollution of

our

tidal

more

Some

waters and marshes.

interested in

how many

trout

hunters and fishermen listened, but others were
you were going to stock in Round Pond, even

though a developer might pollute the pond." 28 (Interestingly,

this

Rachel Carlson had written Silent Spring, which was published

From 1959

to 1962,

occurred before

in 1962.)

Sargent went to Washington to serve as executive director of

a temporary federal commission on recreational open-space resources. In this capac-

he formed a unique partnership to save the Cape Cod shoreline by creating a new

ity,

Alarmed by urban sprawl and the
change forever the pristine
shoreline, Sargent took a lead position in promoting this audacious project. The idea
was anathema to many local real estate agents and businessmen who objected on the
grounds that they would be hurt financially. Others worried that it would bring a
park.

It

was an auspicious time

for such a venture.

proliferation of housing subdivisions that threatened to

rush of tourists, spoiling the habitat and overrunning their quiet communities. En-

of U.S. senators John

listing the support

F.

Kennedy and Leverett

Saltonstall, along

with philanthropist Paul Mellon, Sargent overcame fierce, shortsighted local opposition

by taking a novel approach to the problem of land protection. Previous national

parks had been created by federal land purchases and private funding. To these
techniques, the group added a zoning agreement
set aside the land

landowners were allowed to retain ownership of
nine years, but they had to agree not to develop

Kennedy signed

the law creating the

44,600 acres of land, including forty

Cod

miles flanking Cape

On

his return to

tor in Barnstable

among

and limit development. To minimize

their land for a period of ninetyit.

On August

7,

1961, President

Cape Cod National Seashore, which set aside
miles of shoreline on the Great Beach and ten

Bay.

Massachusetts

County.

the six affected localities to

political opposition, private

He

in 1962,

lost in a

Sargent ran unsuccessfully for state sena-

Republican primary, mainly for lack of time

and poor organization, but he learned from his mistakes. In 1963 he accepted an
appointment from Democratic governor Endicott Peabody to serve as an associate
commissioner of the Department of Public Works. The DPW had just been reorganized following a major scandal, so this was a fairly visible reform appointment.

While undertaking the assignment, he met Al Kramer, who helped him clean up the
mess in the scandal-ridden department.

When
ist

in 1965,

he named Sargent

the head of the department.

The conservation-

Republican John Volpe became governor again

chair of the commission,

making him

had now become a public road

for planning

builder. In his

DPW

role,

Sargent was responsible

and design work on interstate expressway projects, and he led a suc-

cessful effort to secure legislation eliminating local authority to veto state
projects. In

1966 Volpe picked Sargent as his running mate, and the

is

history.

A

Maverick Party Leader

Governor Francis Sargent was the chief spokesman
Republican

Party.

By

virtue of his office, he

was
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for the liberal

rest, as

highway
they say,

wing of the

state

the leader of his party, half be-

sometimes able

bend

own

holdcn to

it,

discipline

were never as strong as some observers remember, but they were

factors in

nominating and electing a governor.

liberal

to

it

to his

vision. Parly organization

Still,

and party

influential

the links were not strong. Sargent's

views frequently clashed with those of right-wing conservative Republicans. As

chasm between the two sides became wide and deep, and they
A more serious and potentially more damaging chasm appeared
among members of the Republican State Committee. Martha Weinberg observed regardthe years

went

on, the

were clearly estranged.

ing Sargent,

The Republican
policies, his

state

committee regarded him with suspicion because of

appointment of

refusal to back unilaterally

many Democrats

all

his liberal

to positions in his administration, his

party candidates, and his

lukewarm response

to the

candidacy of Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew. Sargent, in turn, did not rely
heavily on the state Republican party organization but instead built "Governor

Sargent Committees" in each county in the

tempted
his

own

to

Although several times he

organization to attract the Independents and Democrats

to survive in Massachusetts,

crats

state.

at-

purge the Republican State Committee of his opponents, he relied on

whom

he needed

where a large majority of registered voters are Demo-

and Independents. 29

Sargent possessed an inner ballast that was absolutely unshakable.

He

got along

some members of his own party.
This group included House speaker David Bartley and two consecutive Senate presidents, Maurice Donahue and Kevin Harrington. Their power relationships reflected
better with

Democratic

legislative leaders than with

a partial truce in the cultural wars that had long pitted the Irish against the Yankees.

For the moment, however, Sargent had
the beginning, their relations
his

desk a sign

that read

little

time for such lofty considerations. At

were untested. To break the

Don't Ask Me,

I

Didn't

Go

to

ice, the

governor put on

Harvard, and he set about

wooing enough Democratic lawmakers to allow him to function. By his own admission, "I pissed off some Republicans, but there was no other way to get anything
done." 30 His wooing of Democrats made for prudent politics because it enabled him
to get most of his legislative program enacted. He essentially led a coalition government.

Halting the Construction of Boston Expressways

Immediately on taking office in January 1969, Sargent was confronted by neighborhood and environmental activists seeking to stop five interstate expressway projects
scheduled for completion

in the

Boston metropolitan region. These included the

Inner Belt, 1-95, 1-93, the Southwest Expressway, and the Route 2 extension.

extension of Interstate 95 would have cut through Roxbury, the Back Bay,

The

Cam-

would have required the demolition of
damaged a natural wildlife and conservation
area, Fowl Meadow in the Canton-Milton woods. Many homes of low-income fami31
lies had already been taken by eminent domain and bulldozed for clearance.
With some

bridge, Somerville, and Charlestown and

about 3,800 homes.

It

would have

also

buildings partially demolished and others completely reduced to rubble, the Southwest

Corridor looked like a bombed-out World

War

II

German

city.

Since the community organizers had mobilized a large number of poor minorities

who marched on

the State House, their

demands could hardly be ignored. The
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protest
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quite successful, given the redistributive objectives that the protestors

were pursuing. Day by day, week by week, media-savvy community groups dominated
the public discussion, keeping the issues in their favored frame

and putting the Depart-

ment of Public Works on the defensive.
Cross-pressured, Sargent was cautious in his initial response. After four months,
however, he announced that he would appoint a special task force to review pending
highway plans for the Boston region. He did not do so until September 1969. To
chair the task force, he named Alan Altshuler, a professor of political science at MIT,
who had written on the politics of transportation and planning. The task force included a mix of business leaders, academics, and independent professionals but no
one who had taken a public position on the projects in dispute.
In January 1970, Altshuler informed the governor that the task force would recommend a moratorium on the controversial expressways and the development of a
new, environmentally sensitive plan for a major highway and mass transit facilities
in the Boston area. At the time, no American governor had ever halted work on an
interstate expressway. This was truly the meeting of the moment, the man, and the
place.

The

recommendations touched off an intense, month-long debate that
Donald Dwight opposed the moratorium; Al Kramer favored it. Altshuler, who took a middle-ground position, wanted to
kill some, but not all, of the proposed expressways and build the remainder at reduced scale. As Altshuler recalled, "Sargent confided privately that he thought I was
very likely right technically, but he did not see who would support my middleground position. The pro-highway and anti-highway forces were so polarized that he
32
felt compelled to choose one or the other in clear-cut fashion."
Sargent benefited from the highly politicized context in which policy was being
formulated. Facing the electorate that year, he was searching for issues, allies, and
liberal credentials for the forthcoming election in which he would emerge the winner. Ironically, Sargent, who had previously been pro-highway, came down squarely
on the side of the environmentalists and neighborhood groups. His intuition for the
bold stroke was at hand. The solution, he decided, was to call a halt to construction.
On February 11, 1970, Sargent appeared on television to announce his decision
publicly. The governor endorsed the task force's recommendations and declared a
moratorium on the five expressway projects. His message was simple and compeltask force's

the governor structured with his inner circle.

ling.

Taking note of his role as former

ence, "Nearly everyone

DPW

commissioner, he told his viewing audi-

was sure highways were

problems for years to come. But

the only answer to transportation

we were wrong." 33

In

making such a dramatic

turn-

about, Sargent took a giant step in defining his public image, emphasizing that he

cared about the soft side of politics. His critics thought they could see him manipulating the issue for votes.

But Sargent had no money to carry out the recommended planning study, which
was necessary if he was to replace the discarded plan with a new one. The task force
had estimated a need for $3.5 million, which the Democratic, pro-highway legislature was not about to provide. The Federal Highway Administration was certain to be
hostile. Frank Turner, the federal highway administrator, soon forecast publicly that
Boston would strangle on its traffic unless the proposed expressways were built.
Sargent's only hope was that John Volpe might be persuaded to overrule his subordinates, but such persuasion would be most difficult. Volpe as governor had been
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fully supportive

of the projects to be halted. Sargent had put off informing Volpe of

hour before he went on television, because he did not want to
him an opening to argue the issue.
A few days later, Sargent, along with Allshuler and Massachusetts Bay Transit
Authority chairman Robert Wood, went to Washington to meet with Volpe in the vice
president's office. There was every indication that this meeting would be sensitive.
Volpe marched in with his entourage and immediately started lecturing Sargent. He
told him that he was listening to the wrong people, then pointed directly at Alan
Altshuler. Fortunately, Volpe had his own in-house liberal assistant, Joseph Bosco,
whose views were shifting in this peak year of environmentalism. As things turned
his decision until an

offer

out, the

Massachusetts delegation got the funding they needed.

won

Sargent

the election and

ning Review in 1971. Although

moved ahead with
it

the Boston Transportation Plan-

ultimately resulted in the cancellation of every

major highway project proposed for the Boston metropolitan

area, the

BTPR

process

was not intended to achieve such a result. Rather, it was an effort to assess the relative costs and benefits of a variety of strategies for addressing the region's transpor34
tation needs.
It soon became clear that some projects, including the Inner Belt and
the Route 2 extension, could not be built without enormous disruption.. Consequently, in December 1971, Sargent dropped both roads from further consideration.

35

Calming an Antiwar Protest
Vietnam War and resistance to it escalated, it became increasingly difficult to
at home. Antiwar demonstrations and protests were common occurrences. When the young rebelled against the accustomed norms, the reaction was

As

the

keep the peace

who had

often severe. Older generations of Americans, especially those

World War

II

patriotism.

Most governors

and Korea, were outraged by what they perceived

squads into the

in

streets, often

America responded

served in

as the rejections of

to these crises

by sending

antiriot

using tear gas and billy clubs. With a Republican presi-

Republican governor to come out
was a litmus test. 36 Yet, in response to an
urgent request from Harvard president Nathan Pusey, the governor ordered state
dent in the White House, Sargent was the
against the war. His support of the

Shea

first

bill

police to break up the occupation of University Hall. Several students were arrested

and sent

to jail.

when the Ohio National Guard killed students at Kent State University,
was boiling over on campuses across the country. In Boston, thousands of
angry students descended upon the State House and held an antiwar rally. One of
their speakers demanded that the American flag be lowered to half mast as a tribute
to those slain at Kent State. Shouts of "lower the flag" rippled through the surging
crowd and soon reached a crescendo. Two frightened capitol policemen stood guard
In 1970,

the pot

at the flagpole.

This scene set the stage for what followed. Looking out the
office,

window of

Sargent asked his staff what would happen to the capitol police

lowered. 37

He

his corner

if the flag

was not

would probably be injured. Since the students were only
asking for respect, he ordered Donald Dwight to lower the flag. This statesmanlike gesture averted a near riot and saved the policemen from possible harm. The political task
realized that they
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was one of truly keeping

the peace.

No

one can measure the results of the simplest act

performed under such circumstances, but
dispersed.

had a calming

it

effect.

As Al Kramer later recalled. "Sargent responded not

The crowd gradually

to the anger, but to the

idealism and hope of those times." 38

Many

observers considered the flag incident more as a political statement and

publicity stunt than a genuine peace offering.
ture urged Senate president

Maurice Donahue

The Democratic hawks

who was

caved in to the student demands. Donahue,

in the legisla-

to blast Sargent publicly for

having

seeking the Democratic nomi-

nation for governor, was fully aware of Sargent's distinguished military' combat
record in World

Creating a

War

New

and refused

II

to

do

so.

Cabinet Svstem

Sargent's administrative style evolved considerably between his
term. During the
staff
tion,

first,

first

and his second

confronted by more than 350 state agencies. Sargent and his

were able to do little more than paper over crises, set a few initiatives in moand nurture Sargent's personal image with the media and electorate. In the first

year of Sargent's second term, however, a state cabinet system was created. 39
legislature

had adopted the cabinet system

The

in 1969. deferring its effective date to

1971 on the assumption that a Democrat would win the governorship in 1970.
Maurice Donahue was not about to place ten patronage plums at Sargent's disposal.
After Sargent prevailed in 1970. the legislature balked for several months at funding
the cabinet offices, but finally relented after Sargent

mounted an

effective

media

campaign.

The reorganization plan established

ten

new

"super" executive agencies. The

cabinet secretaries served at the pleasure of the governor, and their staffs were ex-

empt from

civil service.

confirmation. They had

Moreover, their appointments did not require legislative
tittle

statutory authority

7

,

but the governor had broad discre-

tion to delegate agency oversight authority to the secretaries. Sargent, using this

authority to the fullest, also specified that in those matters

him to act personally, he wanted
by their agencies.

to

which

the law required

be advised by the secretaries rather than directly

Sargent appointed well-qualified people to the top positions in his administration,

among them

Peter Goldmark. secretary of

human

services. Charles H. Foster, secre-

commissioner of public welfare, Thomas Atkins, commissioner of housing, David Liederman, director of the office of
children, and Jack Leff, secretary of elder affairs, to mention only a few. Some of
these appointees were Democrats, which did not sit well with hard-line Republicans.
tary of environmental affairs. Steven Minter.

Steven Minter was recruited from Ohio, where he had been director of the welfare
department of Cuyahoga County. Sargent wanted him to straighten out the mess that
resulted

when

the state took over the welfare system

from the

localities in July 1968.

The 351 Massachusetts cities and towns were no longer responsible for welfare, but
the central office was in shambles. There was no standardized payment system for
recipients. Each local office functioned according to the standards of its local director so that there

were large discrepancies

in records.

Saddling the department with the

new Medicaid program simply added to the disarray.
Politicians, depending on their ideological persuasion, wanted to know why recipients were not being paid promptly, why the welfare rolls were increasing, and why venadditional task of administering the
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dors of medical services were not being reimbursed. The National Welfare Rights Organization staged several demonstrations to

background, Minter

He

tried his best to

demand increased

Seen against

benefits.

this

maintain the current level of support and services.

restructured welfare in Massachusetts, and the workings of the system in a managerial

sense improved. Martha Weinberg concludes:

On most management

issues in welfare, the governor

behavior of the agency or

nor and his

There was

staff,

little

to

ensure that

it

act as

managing welfare seldom offered

room

was unable

he wanted

it

to dictate the

to act.

For the gover-

the possibility of clear rewards.

would

for dramatic policy initiation or for intervention that

capture the public imagination. Instead, Sargent faced constraints on his ability to

was

control the department accompanied by constant potential for crisis. This

him

positive incentive for

On

to ignore the

department whenever possible. 40

Wood

another front, Sargent appointed political scientist Robert

Wood had

natural choice.

administration. In Suburbia.

Wood

central reality of the metropolitan community."

4
-

no such

MBTAs

to

be a

at

On assuming

HUD.

his

first

in the

wrote that "transportation

After his tenure

ceived a chance to put his ideas into action locally.
inquired about the

chairman

from Washington, where he had served

and then secretary of housing and urban development

as undersecretary

Lyndon Johnson

just returned

as

(MBTA), which seemed

of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

is

the

he re-

new post Wood

equal opportunity office and, to his dismay, found that

office existed, a situation he brought to Sargent's attention

and took steps

remedy. The agency had a history of discriminating against minorities.

Wood

to

also

oversaw the extension of both the Orange Line and the Red Line. These extensions
dramatically transformed communities like Somerville and Quincy. The

Red Line

extension, which brought Davis Square into being, enabled Tufts University to pros-

per and allowed graduate students

The same

The

at

Harvard and elsewhere to reside

situation developed in Quincy.

in Somerville.

42

Deinstitutionalization of Mental Patients

Frank Sargent named Peter Goldmark, a twenty-nine-year-old whiz kid. as his secretary of

human

services.

Goldmark had previously served

York City administration. One of

move

as

smaller

many people
community

as possible out of the large

facilities.

in

John Lindsay's Newby Sargent, was to

his policy objectives, shared

human

service institutions and into

Goldmark's strategy relied on forcing bureaucratic

agencies to act by applying pressure from constituency groups

at the

grassroots

level.

Whatever
resisted

its

merits, Goldmark's strategy of citizen participation

by mental health commissioner Milton Greenblatt, who

was staunchly

did not favor the

concept of deinstitutionalization. This reform, fueled by federal money, was designed to place mental patients in community residences and halfway houses as an
in large custodial institutions. Under fire from a cition children out of school. Greenblatt stonewalled their efforts to monitor
the implementation of Chapter 750. which called for the delivery- of mental health and
educational services to emotionally disturbed youngsters who were at risk. The commis-

alternative to

warehousing them

zens' task force

sioner also

came under

attack from a legislative
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commission

that

had investigated the
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deaths of four mentally retarded clients at Belchertown. Although an internal probe

conducted by the Department of Mental Health absolved Greenblatt of any negligence
in the matter, the

resignation.

Lolas commission found him partially responsible and called for his

These events led

to his forced departure in

December 1972.

After a six-month nationwide search, Sargent replaced Greenblatt with William

Goldman, a San Francisco psychiatrist. Goldman set a new direction for the department by allowing the citizen area boards to participate in the budgetary process and
by refusing to curry favor with the medical establishment, which was viewed as a
sacred cow. He viewed the doctors as stubborn resisters of change and impediments
to new policies. Furthermore, he infuriated them by refusing to fund psychiatric
residencies at many of the affiliated university hospitals and clinics. Goldman was
the original architect of closing the state mental hospitals. Over the years these institutions had suffered from benign neglect and the quality of treatment of patients had
steadily deteriorated. Under Goldman's direction, three mental hospitals (Grafton,
43
Gardner, and Foxborough) were closed within a span of three years.

Closing Juvenile Jails

In

October 1969, Sargent appointed Jerome Miller commissioner of youth services.

Born in South Dakota in 1932, Miller grew up in Minnesota and attended college in
the Midwest. After graduation, he entered a Catholic seminary and spent five years
studying for the priesthood.

He

subsequently

left the

seminary, joined the U.S. Air

Force, and obtained a doctorate in social work. While stationed in England as a psychiatric social worker,

he had developed a community treatment program for troubled

children of air force personnel. 44

At the time of his Massachusetts appointment, Miller discovered that nearly one
jails or what were commonly

thousand youngsters were incarcerated in juvenile

known

Described in the press as "barbaric

as county training schools.

relics

from an

embarrassing past," these institutions were also known for their harsh and inhumane
treatment of children.

abounded. Not only

Grim

controversy and scandal.

of mental cruelties and physical and sexual abuse
Department of Youth Services (DYS) was plagued by

stories

that, the

Most of

the staff

After two years of attempting to reform

owed

DYS

their jobs to political patronage.

from within, Miller concluded that

"slow change was no change" and that "we could keep
it full

blast

should have to depend on someone else's altruism.
Miller,

it

going as long as

we went

at

and really kept our heads together around a certain altruism, but no one

dismayed by what he learned, decided

the juvenile detention centers during the late
fully apprise the

fall

to

It's

too risky."

go for broke. He began closing

of 1971. At the outset, he did not

governor of his intentions, but word soon leaked out

as the results

became known. By mid- January 1972 he had closed all but one of the institutions,
and the remaining one, Lancaster, housed a substantially reduced population, about
half of whom were participating in a privately run program. The young people were
either paroled home, placed in foster homes, or placed in community-based programs or group homes. The new program, which was federally funded, made Massachusetts the first state to eliminate juvenile prisons and attracted the attention of

penologists across the nation.

DYS

spent the remainder of 1972 attempting to cope

with the consequences of the closings, to consolidate the
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new

directions for treat-

ment of delinquency, and to ward off mounting opposition from the legislature.
DYS was subjected to intensive legislative investigation and public hearings. This
powerful oversight was led by Westfield Democrat Robert McGinn, a former police
officer,

House,

who engaged in a
McGinn yelled to

bitter

feud with Miller. After a shouting match

at the State

reporters, "I'll bury Miller. He's a nut. He's insane.

belongs in an insane asylum." 45 Despite these attacks, Miller had strong

House speaker David Bartley and

state representative

Better yet, he had the support of Jessie Sargent,

He

allies in

John McGlynn of Medford.

who had

a keen interest in the issue

and was a strong public advocate for closing juvenile detention centers. He also had
the support of the Boston Globe. Miller

what he did without the help of these
Miller resigned as commissioner of

would never have been able

to

accomplish

allies.

DYS

in

January 1973 to take a similar posi-

met with reactions as varied as those he had aroused
throughout his stormy thirty-nine months in office. The governor accepted his resignation with public regret; the Boston Globe offered effusive praise; the speaker of
the House lamented the administrative chaos he had left behind; and the legislature
began yet another investigation.
tion in Ohio. His departure

The Park Plaza Urban Renewal Project
Redevelopment Authority proposed the construction of a
$266 million urban renewal project in downtown Boston. The Park Plaza project,
adjacent to the Boston Public Garden, contained some of the most valuable real
46
estate in the city.
This economic development project, which was viewed by the

In early 1971, the Boston

news media
federal aid.

Mayor Kevin White's
One of the two private

as

baby, was to be privately financed without any

developers involved in the project was real estate

tycoon Mortimer Zuckerman, a close friend of the mayor.

Under state law, local urban renewal projects required the approval of the Department of Community Affairs (DCA). On May 4, 1972, Sargent appointed Miles
Mahoney its commissioner. Mahoney had previously served as the director of the
Philadelphia Housing Authority. A month later, on June 9, the new commissioner
turned down the Park Plaza project on the grounds that the site, which included
portions of the tawdry Combat Zone, did not meet the "blight" criterion of the law.
Mahoney's finding sparked a heated controversy. His opponents derisively commented that the blight was not the right blight.
Then came the public outcry. Mayor White vigorously objected and filed home
rule legislation designed to circumvent the need for state approval. At the time.
Sargent was in the process of killing the major highways around Boston. In a period
of inflation and high unemployment, he could ill afford to kill all economic development projects. The administration desperately needed a political trophy. Disagreements and disappointments were initially glossed over. Al Kramer tried his best to
resolve the dispute, but to no avail. Negotiations were at a standstill.
A revised proposal was submitted to Mahoney, who once again rejected it. He
remained resolute in his opposition and refused to back down, but there were repercussions. Both the business community and organized labor got into the act. Some 10.000
angry construction workers marched on the State House to voice their protests. The
battle, which took on a momentum of its own and grew in intensity, reflected the stresses

131

New England Journal

and

of Public Policy

strains in the administration.

On November
to

DCA

29, 1972, Sargent decided to overrule his

push ahead with the project. Soon afterward the governor

ing too parochial and rigid and appointed Louis
irony lay in the fact that the Park Plaza project

commissioner and

fired

Mahoney

for be-

Crampton to replace him. A special
was never built. Instead, the state

constructed a huge transportation building on the

site.

Hiring and Firing a Corrections Commissioner
Prison reform aroused considerable public attention and controversy in Massachusetts in

December 1971. The

prison uprising in Attica,

New

York, and

pression by excessive police force had already shocked the nation.

awakening

that sparked a similar prison uprising at Walpole.

this disturbance,

As

It

its

brutal sup-

was

a rude

a consequence of

Massachusetts corrections commissioner John Fitzpatrick resigned.

The Sargent administration conducted an extensive search

for a

new commissioner

dedicated to prison reform and community-based correctional programs.
governor's staff was seeking someone

and the community

at large.

The

who

The

could bridge the gap between inmates

selection committee chose three finalists

from a

list

of twenty names. Sargent interviewed each of them and picked John O. Boone. 47

A

career civil servant,

Boone was a

forty-nine-year-old black

man from

Atlanta

who had been

the warden of the federal penitentiary at Lorton, Virginia. Although he

worked

considerable disadvantage of being from the South, his race proved

at the

even more of an impediment

and Goldmark did not

in a

department that was almost entirely white. Sargent

set out looking for a black

commissioner, but when they

found a likely black candidate, they believed he might be better able
inmates, a large percentage of

whom

were black. Long persuaded

to relate to

that the Depart-

ment of Corrections (DOC) was an ossified and intransigent bureaucracy, they
wanted someone who would shake things up. The governor told Boone that he
would have "two good years" to implement his programs. "I knew very well, when
appointed him, there was going to be hell to pay," Sargent said, "and there sure

I

was." 48

The prison world was complex and

brutal.

Murders, robberies, rapes, and other

forms of brutality occurred between inmates, toward
taking office,

Boone promptly removed

and

staff,

the superintendents at

staff to inmates.

On

Walpole and Norfolk

and replaced them with wardens from outside the state. DOC personnel were very
unhappy that he had recruited outside the system. Obviously, Boone wanted to improve conditions within the prisons and to reduce the inmate population, but he
seriously underestimated the countervailing

power of

the guards and their labor

union.

To
and

the outrage of prison guards,

to participate in

tions, the

some

Boone allowed

the inmates the right to organize

aspects of prison management.

As

a result of these ac-

guards believed they were in grave physical danger. They were infuriated

by what they perceived as a loss of discipline and control of the prisoners. From
their perspective, they

and closing the

had been stripped of

their authority

and relegated

to

opening

cell gates.

The appointment of Boone ignited a firestorm of protest, stirring emotions on all
As the leading figure of prison reform, Boone was out in front on the issue and

sides.
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hence the lightning rod for criticism. The Boston Herald launched a concerted campaign
to discredit

him. Articles detailing the chaos and disorder that prevailed

in the

prisons

appeared each week. These stories were advanced so vigorously that the governor's press
secretary,

Tom

Rcardon, openly questioned their fairness and accuracy.

The political fallout from the Boston Herald stories had the immediate effect of putting Boone on notice that his job was in jeopardy. It also generated a barrage of criticism
from legislators who were being pressured by the guards. Alarmed by the disorder. Senate
president Kevin Harrington fell that the situation had become dangerously out of hand.
Soon editorials calling for firing Boone were being published.
Under intense fire, Boone had to manage a different and more demanding organizational change. While he had his detractors, he also had his defenders. A coalition
of interested citizens, including prison reform advocates, leaders in the black community, ex-offender groups, and several liberal legislators, staunchly defended him.
state senator Jack Backman of Brookline was among his most ardent
As far as these people were concerned, Boone was doing what needed
The governor showed him steadfast loyalty and declared as much in the

Democratic
supporters.

be done.

to

press.

Tensions
again.

at

Walpole remained high and violence among the inmates erupted

On March

17, 1972,

Walpole exploded into another major

considerable damage. Responding to what became
riot,

Boone announced

a

would take $1.3 million
this outburst, a riot
its

new

new

training

program

known

riot that resulted in

as the Saint Patrick's

and asserted

for the guards

that

Day
it

dollars to turn the corrections system around. Shortly after

occurred

at the

women's prison in Framingham. Boone dismissed
when the guards threatened a walkout.

superintendent, only to reinstate her

Protected by civil service rules, she could not be fired without adequate cause.

Meanwhile, Sargent

filed his

Omnibus Correctional Reform

bill

on February

1972, as one of his "most important pieces of legislation" for that session.

Its

9,

central

provisions were logical and linked: halfway houses, work and education release,
furloughs, prison industries, county jail standards, ex-offenders eligible for correction jobs,

and so on. Sargent contributed

to the

reform effort by placing the prestige

overcome politiwas passed in July 1972, owing in large measure to
the cooperation of speaker David Bartley, who quietly slipped the bill through the
House without much debate.
of his office behind

cal obstacles.

A

it

and

The omnibus

utilizing his talents in public relations to
bill

series of dreadful events

combined

to dramatize the

dangerous situation

in the

prisons and to seal the commissioner's fate. These included the killing of two prison

guards by a Norfolk inmate; another inmate killed himself

bomb

when

his

homemade

Concord doused the prison chaplain
rescue before they could immolate him;

accidentally exploded; the inmates at

with gasoline, but state police came to the

and a convicted murderer killed again while on furlough. The guards, traumatized by
these horrific events, especially the murders of their fellow guards, staged a one-day

sickout in protest. Sargent attended the funerals where he received a hostile reception.

The guards publicly branded him a murderer. Unaccustomed
was deeply shaken. He recalled:

to

such abusive

treatment, he

But

to

go

to a funeral

and as

far as

you can

see, a line

on

either side of the church, of

corrections officers in uniform from around our state and from surrounding states, from

Rhode

Island and elsewhere.

And to walk into the church and you
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tried to

shake hands with a couple and

pew with the casket and

a

I

got

"Go

—k you!," and

on, f

all

that

was a little unnerving to go in and sit in the front
woman comes over to beat your brains in, that gets to be

kind of stuff, outside the church.

It

tough. Also you have the television cameras noting that and that doesn't play very well

on the news. 49
In the meantime, the savage attacks on

Boone

continued. Cumulatively, these

pushed a political hot button and made his firing almost inevitable. For
Sargent, under incredible pressure, especially with his reelection campaign less than
a year away, the situation was deteriorating fast.
assaults

By

the spring of 1973, the governor's staff and

They were convinced

to go.

that

Goldmark

presence jeopardized the entire reform program. Goldmark

going under, there was no point

realized that

Boone had

he was a weak administrator and that his continued

in

felt that if

Boone was

wasting any more currency on him. Despite his

was not disposed to tolerate further chaos, which
The time of genuine reckoning had arrived. Sargent explained:

public pronouncements, Sargent

had taken

its toll.

The main reason the whole corrections thing became very tough wasn't merely the
fact we had some violence, somebody killed, the fact we had a strike and all that
sort of stuff. It was the day-to-day pressure from the newspapers. When you're in
public life and you get a few bad headlines it isn't all that much fun, but when you
get them day after day after day and week after week after week, then it gets rugged and you have to do something about it. 50
it was not an easy choice for him. He had
Boone and knew how much the commissioner had suffered during
Once Sargent decided to fire him, the question became how to do so

In the end, Sargent capitulated, but

great respect for
the long ordeal.

without appearing to surrender to the anti-Boone forces.

On

went on television and announced
He felt it was important to
praise Boone and his cause, even as he fired him. The stormy Boone era was over.
Ultimately, the governor replaced Boone with Frank A. Hall, who was deputy
commissioner of the North Carolina Department of Prisons. Before long, Hall restored peace to Walpole and the other prisons. He succeeded in keeping the prisons
relatively safe and orderly, while cautiously implementing his package of reforms.
the evening of June 20, 1973, the governor

The tone of

his decision.

his speech

was

conciliatory.

Sargent versus Dukakis

It is

interesting to

compare Francis Sargent with Michael Dukakis.

In

many

respects,

they were the antithesis of each other, offering a vivid contrast between the pragma-

and the idealist, the affable honest broker and the detached policy wonk. Sargent
was more friendly and less driven than Dukakis. They took an instant dislike to each

tist

other at their
ality.

first

meeting. The two governors differed sharply in style and person-

Where Dukakis was

cold, aloof,

and arrogant, Sargent displayed warmth,

charm, and a remarkable lack of arrogance; where Dukakis was

and a paragon of

virtue,

stiff,

self-righteous,

Sargent was relaxed, flamboyant, and profane; where

Dukakis was viewed as a technocrat and a know-it-all, Sargent was perceived as a good
listener

who

humor and

reached out for the views of others. Dukakis was almost devoid of a sense of

therefore unable to empathize and soothe chafed egos the
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way Sargent

did.

About the only characteristic the two men shared was their. personal frugality.
While Sargent had his strengths, he also had his weaknesses. He haled to fire people
his most painful task was firing John Boone. He also had difficulty relating to blacks.

—

As

a public manager, Sargent did not focus on details and had a short attention span nor

economic development. He was bored by fiscal and adminisin principle and appointed excellent
people to handle them, but he assigned them little priority and preferred not to learn
much about them. Hence, he chose not to heed the Cassandra-like warnings of his budget
director and left his successor, Michael Dukakis, a large deficit estimated to be somedid he

become absorbed

He

trative issues.

in

recognized their importance

where around $200 million.
Sargent's style was diametrically opposite to that of his nemesis. His centralized
management ran directly counter to Dukakis's hands-on managerial style. Altshuler
puts it even more crisply: "Sargent felt comfortable delegating, and he had no apparent sense of competitiveness with his appointees.

He viewed

himself as a conductor
51

Dukakis
was more the star soloist who found it difficult to delegate. Advised of his shortcomings, the "Duke" attempted to change his image with a makeover. After losing the
governorship to Edward King in 1978, he won it back in 1982 by convincing voters
that he was a new, humble, more mellow figure ready to listen. There are many styles
of leadership, so this is not to say that one style is better than another; but there are
rather than star soloist

and delighted

in surrounding himself with talent."

significant differences.

With due adjustment for contrasts

was a

final dissimilarity.

in their style, character,

and personality, there

Sargent did not have an ideological center, which gave him

He was

make judgments case by
enough to make a decision,
then purged his mind of them. What emerged over time was a governor who consistently protected the weak underdog and the environmentalists while acting in ways
that kept him in tune with the populace. Did Sargent change in any important sense
a broader range in decision making.

oriented to

case. Like a classic manager, he retained the facts long

the

way governors make

Close observers of gubernatorial policy

their decisions?

conclude that he did. Alan Altshuler sums up:
Sargent, in short,

was a man of

politics

and concrete decisions. While

resistant to

ideology in the abstract, his decisions expressed a consistent set of liberal values.
His interest in

management was confined,

and inspiring their loyalty.
stances,
to

He was

one who responded

him by

staff.

in general, to selecting

to crises

and chose from among the options brought

But he also gave the highest

talented staff; he could be extremely patient
fresh options;

and he was willing

which he cared deeply. He had
fiscal

and administrative

detail

key personnel

a reactive decision-maker in most circum-

to take

priority to recruiting a diverse

when they needed time

major

his blind spots,

count for a

lot.

risks

on behalf of

most notably

and

to generate

policies about

in those areas

where

But he led an exciting administration

with unfailing decency, compassion and integrity. 52

The Sargent Legacy
Frank Sargent was respected and admired on Beacon

Hill,

where he earned a reputation

Democrats and Republicans still speak
fondly of him. Reflecting on his own experience, former House speaker David Bartley
remarked, "Frank Sargent was one of the finest human beings I've ever met, and certainly
for objectivity

and wise judgment. To

this day,
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53
the best governor I've served under."

Former Senate president Kevin Harrington put it
somewhat differently, "Sargent had great instincts. He had a political piano tuner's ear;
he had perfect pitch. He could smell whether an idea was good, great, or bad."54
To his credit, Sargent took more stand-up positions on legislation than most of his
predecessors, and in his six years he received the highest percentage of bipartisan

Add

support.

to the legislative record the policy innovations

introduced through

executive orders, gubernatorial memoranda, and rules and regulations, and the
record

is

even more impressive.

problems of urban

No

the decade.

He was

the first governor to address the manifold

His cabinet plan matched the best organizational theory of

life.

other Republican leader in Massachusetts had so consciously and

successfully developed a strategy for involving experts and academics in the vari-

Many

ous stages of policymaking.

As

of his appointments were bold and courageous.

historians struggle with the Sargent legacy, they will

no doubt remember him

for his balanced transportation policy and his policy option of deinstitutionalization.

Whatever

on specific

the verdict

environmental visionary.

He

policies, they will

remember him most of

all

as an

did more for the cause of the environment than any of

and successors.

his predecessors

But Sargent was not an original thinker or a great idea person. He relied on Al
Kramer, Robert Yasi, and others
source. His wife, Jessie,

health efforts.

Of

the

was

many

to feed

him

ideas.

They were a dependable policy

the driving force behind Jerome Miller and the mental

participants

who

influenced policy and programs, the

governor's staff and the Boston Globe played an invaluable role. Sargent had a good

working relationship with the publishers of the Globe

as well as with other

media

allies.

In Leadership Without

who presume

ers

Easy Answers, Ronald Heifetz distinguishes between

make

that their responsibility is to

others to confront problems. Sargent clearly

decisions and leaders

falls into

the latter category.

lead-

who help
He be-

lieved in participatory democracy and sought to develop ways of having ordinary

people get involved in making

critical

decisions that affected their lives deeply.

Such a phenomenon was entirely new in state politics. Until Sargent came along, the
question of empowering nonestablishment groups remained largely unexplored and
undefined.

One

of Sargent's most important legacies was the extent to which he reshaped the

state's judiciary.

He

filled

ninety-seven judgeships, both

superior court levels. This large

law

that required

judges to

at the district

number of vacancies was

retire at

and

at the

the result mainly of a

new

age seventy. William Young, the governor's legal

counsel, was largely responsible for coordinating this effort. While patronage considerations

were taken into account

in

appointing district court judges, the same was

not true with regard to superior court judges,

who were chosen

strictly

Since there were only a few blacks on the bench, diversity was also a

on merit.
factor.

Sargent

appointed David Nelson, a highly respected black lawyer, to the superior court.

Nelson

later

became a

judicial appointments

federal district court judge. Overall, the quality of Sargent's

was of the highest

rank.

Frank Sargent died on October 22, 1998, at the age of eighty-three. The Boston
Globe published an editorial that captured both his political and his personal legacy.
It is

worth quoting

at length:
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Francis

W. Sargent always acted

John Powers

this

were the most enjoyable

as if his six years as governor

accident that could befall a man.

"I

got a hell of a big kick out of it," he told the Globe's

summer.

The sentiment was mutual. Nearly everyone

at the State

House from 1969

1975 drew on Sargent's infectious sense of enjoyment. This included his top

to
lieu-

tenants as well as the Democratic leaders in the Legislature. If he had an afternoon

meeting with House Speaker David Bartley, Sargent
release in the

would

morning blasting him

start off

on the right

But he did not see

was

a

He

often, vision.

more

One of

game of

tricks requiring deception

political executive, taking

its

takeover of welfare from the

and

guile.

He

on issues with boldness and,

when

presided during a period of significant transition,

was implementing
taking

would put out a press

foot.

politics as a

most straightforward

said, he

for something or other just so the meeting

the state

and towns and was also

cities

responsibility for funding local education and school construction.

his

most memorable actions was stopping construction of the planned

Inner Belt of highways. His appointments were superior; his Cabinet

viewed as the best of the modern

era,

is

widely

with the possible exception of the Cabinet in

Michael Dukakis's third term.
Sargent, an architect

attempts to

made

list

his

the state feel

by

training

and a fisherman by choice, would laugh

at

accomplishments, but they were considerable. The fact that he

good

in the process is a legacy to

be treasured, and remem-

bered. 55

Frank Sargent made substantial progress

in solving the

problems that the citizens

of Massachusetts faced, a goal that had eluded his predecessors. Single-minded and
secure in his convictions, he responded effectively to contentious social issues.

such issues still generate controversy. He made his share of
made adjustments and moved on. Despite the fact that his career ended in defeat, he made a significant impact on the governorship itself. By
seizing the policy initiative and exercising vigorous leadership, he broke the mold
Several decades

later,

mistakes, but he also

and turned the governor's office

most enduring

legacy.

That

into an instrument for social change.

is

his

$g

Notes
1

2.

.

For a good analysis of the development of the office, see Victoria Schuck, "The
Massachusetts Governorship: Hamstrung by History?" in Robert R. Robbins, ed., The
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